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ABSTRACT 
Severe and widespread drought occurred over a large portion of the 1.!nited States betw.een 1974 and 1977. 
Impacts on agriculture and other industries, as well as l~ water'Sup~bes, were substan~. The ~ederal gov-
ernment responded with forty assistance programs admmistered by SIXteen federal agenaes: ~ce ~ 
provided primarily in the form ofloans and grants to people, businesses and governments expenenClDg hardship 
caused by drought. The total cost of the program is estimated at $7-8 billion. . 
. Federal response to the mid-1970s drought was largely untimely, ineffective and poorly coordinated. Four 
recommendations are offered that, if implemented, would imp~ove. future drou~t assessl!'-ent and response 
efforts: 1) reliable and timely informational products and dissemmatlon p!ansj .2) Im~roved Impact ~ment 
techniques, especially in the agriC11ltural sector, for use by government to Iden~ penods of enhanced nsk and 
to trigger assistance measures; 3) administratively centralized drought declaratlon procedures ~t are well p~b­
licized and consistently applied; and 4) standby assistance measures that encourage appropnate levels o~nsk 
management by producers and that are equitable, consistent and predictab~e. 'J?Ie ~evelopmen~ of a natlonal 
drought plan tbat incorporates these four items is recommended. Atmospbenc SClentlsts have an Importan~ ~le 
to play in the collection and interpretation of near-real time weather data for use by government declSlon 
makers. 
1. Introduction 
Drought is a characteristic feature' of the climate of 
the Great Plains. Although scientists disagree on what 
constitutes a drought (Wilhite and Glantz, 1985), it 
represents a common experience that, in a sense, binds 
the region together. During the past century the Great 
Plains has been plagued by five major and numerous 
minor drought episodes as well as innumerable dry 
spells. In fact, drought occurs somewhere in the Great 
Plains almost every year. 
Although severe drought generally occurs more fre-
quently in the Great Plains than elsewhere in the 
United States, no part ofthe nation is immune (Karl 
and Knight, 1985). Severe drought is generally aSso-
ciatedwith cumulative moisture deficiencies of suffi-
cient magnitude that, when extended over a substantial 
length of time, result in far-reaching impacts over a 
rather large geographical area. For example, in response 
to the severe drought of July and August of 1983 the 
federal government designated 1123 counties in 22 
states as drought disaster areas. In addition to the des-
ignations that were made in the Great Plains states of 
• Published as Paper No. 7720, Journal Series, Nebraska AgriC11l-
tural Experiment Station. 
t NCAR is sponsored by the National Science Foundation. 
@ J 986 American Meteorological Society 
Nebraska Kansas, New Mexico and Texas, the federal , . 
government also declared parts of Alabama, Georgia, 
Virginia, West Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, .South 
Carolina,Pennsylvania and parts of most Mldwest 
states eligible for low-interest disaster loans because of 
drought. .. 
The actions of the federal government 10 responding 
to the 1983 drought are not unique. In fact, these ac-
tions seem almost inconsequential when compared to 
the massive drought relief programs formulated in re-
sponse to the major episodes of severe drought that 
have occurred in the United States during the 20th 
century. For example, during the droughts of the mid-
19705 the federal government was responsible for the 
most massive drought relief program in United States 
history. The General Accounting Office (GAO, 1979) 
calculated the cost of the drought program to four fed-
eral agencies alone at over $5 billion during 1976-77. 
Wilhite et al. (1984) estimated expenditures by all fed-
eral agencies involved in the response effort, plus ad-
ministrative costs at both the federal and state level, 
between $7-8 billion from 1974-77. 
In 1981 we began to document and evaluate federal 
and state response to the mid-1970s drought in the 
United States. A preliminary report of our findings ap-
pears elsewhere (Wilhite, 1983). Since each drought 
relief effort has relied, to some extent, on the precedents 
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set in previous episodes, it is not surprising that some 
mistakes and failures have been repeated. Here we 
document and evaluate efforts to respond to drought 
in 1976-77. Recommendations are given on ways to 
improve the effectiveness of the federal government's 
response to future droughts. The advantages of a na-
tional drought plan that would incorporate most of 
these recommendations will also be discussed. 
2. Methodology 
The task of documenting and evaluating federal and 
state response to drought in the United States was di-
vided into four subtasks in order to address the project 
objectives most efficiently. The first subtask was to 
document the history of government and nongovern-
ment drought response in the Great Plains from the 
period of settlement up to the 1950s. In subtask 2 we 
documented, in greater detail, federal and state re-
sponse to the mid-1970s drought. This involved study 
of the overall federal drought response structure, in-
cluding assistance programs, designation procedures, 
information availability and flow, and policy formu-
lation procedures. In subtask 3 the federal drought ac-
tions were evaluated with reference to each of the com-
ponents listed in subtask 2. In subtask 4 we docu-
mented and evaluated federal and state government 
actions in response to drought in Nebraska, South 
Dakota and Texas. In this paper we report the results 
of subtasks 2 and 3, particularly. The results of each 
of the subtasks are presented in greater detail elsewhere 
(Wilhite et aI., 1984). 
Information about the actions of federal and state 
agencies in assessing and responding to the mid-1970s 
drought was derived through an analysis of official 
government files, personal interviews with government 
and nongovernment officials, and by mail question-
naire. The following were the main sources of infor-
mation: 
I) Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan; 
2) Secretary of Agriculture Executive Correspon-
dence Files, Washington, DC; 
3) Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Ser-
vice files, Washington, DC; 
4) Corps of Engineers files, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia; 
5) Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture, Washington, DC; 
6) National Archives, Washington, DC; 
7) History Branch, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Washington, DC; 
8) National Agricultural Library, Beltsville, Mary-
land; 
9) Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, 
Abilene, Kansas; 
1O} Western Governors' Policy Office (WESTPO), 
Denver, Colorado; 
11) State and federal agency files in Nebraska, South 
Dakota, and Texas. 
By analyzing both primary sources of information and 
numerous secondary sources, we were able to recon-
struct the timetable of events associated with the mid-
1970s drought and evaluate the series of assessment 
and response actions implemented by federal and state 
government. 
3. Federal response to drought in 1976-77 
That the federal government would attempt to mit-
igate some of the most severe impacts of widespread 
drought during the mid-1970s was not unexpected. 
Droughts of greater intensity and duration during the 
1930s and 1950s had produced similar responses. Al-
though the organizational structure for administering 
drought relief and the forms of assistance available 
changed significantly during the fifty years before the 
mid-1970s drought, the fundamental approach did not. 
During the mid-I 970s drought, the Federal Disaster 
Assistance Administration (FDAA) was responsible for 
administering grants to presidentially declared disaster 
areas from the President's Disaster Relief Fund. More-
over, the FDAA was responsible for directing and co-
ordinating the assistance efforts of all federal agencies 
(FDAA, 1975). The list of federal disaster assistance 
programs available in 1975 was extensive. Few, if any, 
of these programs had been designed specifically to re-
spond to problems caused by drought. 
The series of state and federal actions that resulted 
in response to the drought of 1976-77 are described 
in detail below. Table 1 provides a timetable for these 
actions. 
Federal Drought Response, 1976. The first federal 
actions were initiated during the last year of the Ford 
administration in response to requests from Governor 
Richard F. Kneip and Representative James Abdnor 
of South Dakota in July of 1976. The governor re-
quested federal agencies to provide maximum assis-
tance to the severely stricken drought areas in his state 
(Kneip, 1976). This request prompted the president to 
direct the Domestic Council to review the socioeco-
nomic impacts of drought in the Dakotas, Minnesota 
and Wisconsin and to determine if additional assistance 
could be provided under existing federal laws and pro-
grams (May, 1976). The governor's letter was followed 
by a request from Representative Abdnor to the sec-
retary of agriculture for the creation of a special task 
force to review and improve current drought assistance 
programs (Abdnor, 1976). In response to Abdnor's re-
quest, a special cabinet-level drought committee was 
formed by the president in late October. The commit-
tee's objectives included the development of a drought 
monitoring scheme and a comprehensive plan and 
program for delivering short-term assistance to 
drought-affected areas. 
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TABLE 1. Drought-related actions and responses of the federal and state government, 1976-77. 
Action/Date 
1976 
Request for action from South Dakota governor and others-
July 
Request by Rep. Abdnor (South Dakota) for the creation of a 
drought task force-July 
1977 
States form regional alliances, Western Governor's Task Force 
on Regional Policy Management meets to discuss drought 
conditions-January 
Western governors meet with Secretary Andrus-January 
Federal drought coordinator requests drought-related 
information from 13 federal agencies-February 
Presidential drought package for $844 million submitted to 
Congress-March 23 
Formation of an Interagency Drought Coordinating 
Committee to designate Emergency Drought Impact Areas 
under the president's drought program-April 
Drought conditions improve between April and August in the 
Great Plains and Upper Midwest states, and by December in 
the Far West states 
The special cabinet-level drought committee re-
ported to President Ford on 28 December 1976. By 
this time, 325 counties had been declared emergency 
disaster areas. Basically, the report provided a summary 
of federal response to date, a status report of the current 
situation and an indication of problem areas. Their 
findings suggested that current programs "may not be 
able to cope effectively if the situation deteriorates 
much further" (Bell, 1976). The report concluded, 
". . . When drought occurs it is difficult to determine 
the nature and extent of federal assistance required, 
and some emergency programs are not designed to cope 
with agricultural drought." 
The drought committee's report reached President 
Ford on 3 January 1977, seventeen days before the end 
of his term of office. The committee's report provided 
only a cursory examination of the drought problem 
and did not deal with the questions oflong-term policy 
cited among the committee's original objectives. In-
cluded in the report was a tabulation showing federal 
assistance in presidentially declared emergency areas 
up to 1 December 1976 (Table 2). 
Federal drought response during the Ford admin-
istration is best summarized as reaction-oriented. Little, 
ifany, planning was done to develop alternative actions 
under possible scenarios of future conditions. No new 
programs were developed and no coordinated effort 
was made to respond to deteriorating conditions. 
Response/Date 
Domestic Council directed by President Ford to review 
socioeconomic impact-September 
President Ford appoints special cabinet-level task force-
October, issues report in December 
Western States Water Council begins to monitor drought-
January 
Commitments by federal and state governments for action, 
President Carter and governors appoint drought 
coordinators-January to early March 
Drought appraisal report prepared under leadership of the 
Corps of Engineers for submission to President Carter-
mid-March . 
Drought package passed almost intact by Congress, except for 
two items-April to early May 
2145 counties declared by this committee between April 25 
and September 12 
Federal drought assistance estimated between $7-8 billion for 
1976-77 
Federal Drought Response, 1977. In January of 
1977, regional alliances were formed by states to put 
added political pressure on Washington for action. On 
23 January 1977, the Western Governors' Task Force 
on Regional Policy Management met to discuss the 
scope and magnitude of western drought (WESTPO, 
1978). Following this meeting, the western governors' 
lead agency for water policy and development, the 
Western States Water Council (Wswq, began to 
monitor the drought situation at regular intervals. The 
governors met with the newly appointed interior sec-
retary, Cecil Andrus, to discuss state needs and federal 
actions to mitigate the societal impact of drought. Al-
though many areas of the nation were entering their 
second, arid a few locations their third, consecutive 
year of drought, .this was the first such joint discussion 
of mitigation alternatives by state and federal officials. 
The meeting with Secretary Andrus concluded with 
several commitments by the secretary and the gover-
nors. The secretary agreed to seek the appointment of 
a federal drought coordinator and to encourage the 
president to discuss the drought issue at the National 
Governors Conference. The governors also agreed to 
consider the need for alternative approaches to coop-
erative, multilateral drought response actions and to 
designate state drought coordinators. [By early March, 
twenty states had appointed drought coordinators 
(WESTPO, 1978)]. 
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TABLE 2. Summary offederal grant and loan programs providing assistance due to drought, 1 December 1976 (Bell, 1976). This summary 
reflects the applications for grants and loans received and the funds requested therein following the presidential emergency declarations and 
through November 1976 in the States of Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Virginia and Wisconsin. Eleven counties in 
Arkansas were declared eligible for assistance on 3 December 1976. The data contained herein is limited to assistance provided in the areas 
covered by the presidential emergency declarations due to drought. The assistance included in this report is being provided through emergency 
and regular program authorities. 
Estimated 
Applications amount Applications Amount paid 
Agency jProgram 
Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, DHUD 
Hay and Cattle Transportation Assistance ............. . 
Small Business Administration 
Economic Injury Disaster Loans .................... . 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, USDA 
Disaster Payment Program ......................... . 
Emergency Livestock Feed Program (Now being phased out 
due to lack of CCC-owned feed grain stocks) ........ . 
Farmers Home Administration, USDA 
Emergency Loans ................................ . 
Economic Development Administration, DOC 
Economic Development-Special Economic Development 
and Adjustment Assistance Program ............... . 
* Partial payments on some applications . 
•• Amount to be determined after further evaluation. 
In response to these initiatives President Carter ap-
pointed Jack Watson to be federal drought coordinator. 
One of Watson's first actions was to request each of 
thirteen federal agencies to prepare a report by 3 March 
(a lead time ofless than one week) that would include: 
1) a brief evaluation of the impacts and drought-related 
problems in each agency's area of responsibility; 2) a 
list and description of drought assistance programs; 3) 
a statement of administration or funding problems; 4) 
an evaluation of complaints from state and local gov-
ernments and drought victims; 5) suggestions of leg-
islative changes or initiatives that might help to better 
organize and deliver federal assistance in support of 
state and local government efforts (Watson, 1977). 
The agency reports submitted to Watson totaled 
several thousand pages and were, not surprisingly, 
lacking in uniformity and consistency. Watson rec-
ognized the inability of his staff to restructure the raw 
information provided by the agencies into a format 
that would be useful in the decision-making process 
(Kallaur, 1977). The Corps of Engineers was asked to 
coordinate this assimilation process. The Corps ac-
cepted this task and completed it within one week, as 
directed. The thirteen reporting agencies became 
known as the White House Drought Study Group. The 
Drought Appraisal Report, as it was called, was com-
pleted on March 18 and served as the basis for President 
Carter's drought program. 
The Drought Appraisal Report described drought 
conditions in the United States and addressed questions 
received ($) payments ($) 
18,456 83,312,926 9,701 7,154,121* 
31 1,101,500 19 701,500 
151,869 172,050,000 70,712 65,497,000 
NjA 4,300,00 NjA 4,300,000 
7,300 207,263,000 2,956 133,263,000 
22 Undetermined·· 8 1,556,000* 
of water conservation, water supply augmentation and 
management measures, and suggested possible im-
mediate mitigating actions. The report concentrated 
heavily on drought impacts in the Far West, sometimes 
to the point of down playing, if not neglecting, those 
areas plagued by extreme drought in the Midwest and 
northern plains states. 
Federal response activities continued to expand 
during March as drought conditions intensified and 
encompassed larger geographic areas. Emergency loans 
from FmHA were made available to 706 counties in 
27 states. Livestock feed assistance was provided in 
436 counties in 12 states by ASCS. By the end of March 
the FDAA was providing aid to 16 states, by presiden-
tial declaration, through three assistance programs 
(FDAA, 1977). The three programs provided assistance 
for hay transportation, cattle transportation and emer-
gency feed. The USDA was responsible for coordinat-
ing most of the assistance activities in the agricultural 
sector. 
President Carter sent a request to Congress on 23 
March for $844 million in loans and grants for farmers, 
ranchers, communities and businesses stricken by 
drought. Table 3 provides the details of the president's 
program. This program was passed intact by Congress, 
except for the Small Business Administration legisla-
tion and a reduction in funds, from $225 to $175 mil-
lion, for the Economic Development Agency (EDA) 
loan and grant program (Crawford, 1978). The water 
bank bill was signed by the president on 7 April. Other 
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TABLE 3. President Carter's proposed drought program, 23 March 1977 (WESTPO, 1978). 
Title Purpose/Description Amount ($) 
Emergency Loans Program (FmHA) 
Community Program Loans (FmHA) 
5% loans to cover prospective losses to farmers and ranchers 100,000,000 
225,000,000 $150 million in 5% loans and $75 million in grants to communities ofless 
than 10,000 for emergency water supplies 
Emergency Conservation Measures 
Program (ASCS) 
Soil Conservation cost-sharing grants 100,000,000 
FCIC Insurance Increase FCIC capital stock 
Drought Emergency Program Creation of water bank, protection of fish and wildlife, grants to states, 5% 
100,000,000 
100,000,000 
(BuRec) for water supply and conservation measures 
Emergency irrigation loans Emergency Fund (BuRec) 
Emergency Power (SWPA) 
Community Emergency Drought 
Purchase of emergency· power supply 
30,000,000 
13,800,000 
225,000,000* 
Relief Program (EDA) 
$150 million in 5% loans and $75 million in grants to communiti~s of 
more than 10,000 for emergency water supply 
·Physical Loss and Economic Injury 
Loans (SBA) 
Low-interest loans for small businessmen (including farmers) 50,000,000** 
Total 844,000,000 
* Only $175 million of this amount was finally appropriated. 
** Action on this proposal resulted in the lowering of interest rates for Physical Loss and Economic Injury Loans (both ongoing, funded 
programs) but none of the additional appropriation originally requested was granted. 
portions of the "package" were delayed until early May. 
Program funds were to be expended or committed by 
30 September 1977. 
In late March, discussion was initiated on the for-
mation of an Interagency Drought Coordinating Com-
mittee (IDCC), the major function of which was to 
designate areas eligible for federal assistance. This fed-
eral assistance, however, referred only to programs au-
thorized in President Carter's "drought package." 
Members ofthe IDCC included representatives ofthe 
United States Department of Agriculture (chairman), 
the Small Business Administration and the Depart-
ments of Interior and Commerce. Geographic areas 
designated by the IDCC were referred to as Emergency 
Drought Impact Areas (EDIAs). 
During the first formal meeting of the IDCC, held 
on 25 April 1977, the committee designated 1183 
counties as EDIAs. Of these, 842 had already received 
presidential or secretarial declarati9ns (Stockton, 1977). 
The EDIAs were located in 24 western and midwestern 
states. The list of declarations grew during the summer 
months. By 12 September 1977, the date of the last 
declaration, 2145 counties (70 percent of all counties 
in the United States) were included as EDIAs (Fig. 1). 
These designations were to expire on 30 September. 
In the early stages of the IDCC there were no distinct 
criteria for the designation of EDIAs. At least half of 
the counties designated during this time period were 
so designated with no supporting documentation. The 
need for such criteria was discussed during the third 
meeting of the IDCC, on 3 May. It was agreed that 
ASCS would draft a ~ist of criteria. The list was pre-
sented to and approved by the committee on 20 May. 
The list included the Palmer Drought Severity Index 
(PDSI). This index was apparently the principal criteria 
used by the IDCC to determine eligibility for drought 
assistance (GAO, 1979). 
Considerable confusion appears to have developed 
over IDCC designations. Many federal and state offi-
cials assumed that counties were automatically eligible 
for all federal programs after they had been designated 
by the IDCe. Although it is not so specified in the 
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FIG. I. Emergency Drought Impact Areas (EDIAs) designated by 
the IDCC between April 25 and September 12, 1977 (Federal Reg-
ister). 
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original memorandum of agreement, IDCC designa-
tions were intended to apply only to programs included 
in the presidential drought package. Following IDCC 
designation, counties became automatically eligible for 
only one of the many drought package programs, 
FmHA's Emergency Loan Program. To qualify for 
other programs in the package, counties had to meet 
the special eligibility requirements of each program. 
Eligibility for programs not included in the presidential 
drought package was determined on a program-by-
program basis and was not linked to IDCC designa-
tions. 
The only distinction between IDCC designated and 
non-IDCC counties was that the former had access to 
the special drought funds associated with the president's 
drought package. IDCC designations were sweeping, 
usually focusing on states rather than individual coun-
ties. The detailed, county-level evaluation process was 
left to the several involved federal agencies. 
Although the presidential drought package was sub-
stantial ($844 million)-one of the largest single ap-
propriations for drought relief in the nation's history-
it represented only a small portion of the total federal 
drought assistance program. Forty programs were 
available to provide assistance to the private sector 
during 1976-77. However, six programs accounted for 
the vast majority of funds disbursed. These were: 1) 
the Farmers' Home Administration's Emergency Loan 
Program; 2) the Small Business Administration's Di-
saster Loan Program; 3) the Department of Com-
merce's Community Emergency Drought Relief Pro-
gram; 4) the Bureau of Reclamation's Emergency Fund 
Program; 5) the Bureau of Reclamation's Emergency 
Drought Program; and 6) the Farmers' Home Admin-
istration's Community Program Loans and Grants. 
The authorizations and activities associated with each 
of these programs during the 1976-77 drought have 
been summarized in a General Accounting Office re-
port (GAO, 1979) entitled "Federal Response to the 
1976-77 Drought: What Should Be Done Next?" The 
GAO reported that the Departments of Agriculture, 
Commerce, and Interior and SBA alone administered 
more than $5 billion in drought relief programs to water 
users during 1976-77. However, if the cost of programs 
administered by other federal agencies is included, as 
well as the cost of the relief programs of 1974 and 
drought-related administration costs to states during 
1974-77, the total cost of the drought to government 
can be conservatively estimated at between $7-8 billion 
(Wilhite et aI., 1984). 
4. Improving federal response to drought: Recommen-
dations 
In view of the experiences of the mid-1970s and pre-
vious drought relief efforts, certain lessons emerge 
about ways to improve governmental response to pe-
riods of widespread and severe drought. Based on the 
foregoing information, four basic requirements for 
more effective response by federal government are sug-
gested: 1) reliable and timely information and dissem-
ination plans; 2) objective and reliable impact assess-
ment procedures; 3) objective and timely designation 
procedures; and 4) appropriate disaster programs and 
efficient program administration and delivery systems. 
Information products and dissemination plans. The 
drought response efforts of the mid-1970s were not 
based on adequate and systematic provision of timely 
information on drought conditions and impacts to in-
dividuals and agencies involved in administering pro-
grams. Although the availability of reliable, current and 
properly formatted information does not ensure correct 
and timely decisions on the part of government offi-
cials, it is at least reasonable to believe that good de-
cisions are less likely to be made on the basis of in-
adequate or incorrect information. 
Many types of information are needed during pe-
riods of drought if the widely ranging impacts asso-
ciated with water shortages are to be adequately ad-
dressed. For example, meteorological data is necessary 
to describe the degree of water shortage and to identify 
those geographical areas most affected. Such data, in 
conjunction with information on soil moisture con-
ditions, can be used for early projections of yield. 
Commodity prices, in conjunction with projected yield 
figures, can be used to estimate monetary losses for 
principal grain, vegetable and hay crops. Data on 
stream flow ap.d ground water depletion rates provide 
important information on the outlook for water supply 
to the agricultural, municipal and industrial sectors. 
A common requirement for all types of drought-
related information is that it be reliable, effectively or-
ganized and timely. In almost all cases during the mid-
1970s drought, government agencies did not assemble 
assessments of the drought situation until drought 
conditions had reached critical proportions. 
To improve the ability of government to respond 
effectively in times of drought, the drought situation 
and its consequent impacts must be continually mon-
itored. Since weather data form the basis for virtually 
all other assessments, special attention should be given 
to providing relevant observations of precipitation and 
calculations of evapotranspiration and soil moisture 
status. Networks of automated weather stations such 
as the one being developed in Nebraska, South Dakota, 
Colorado, Kansas and Wyoming under partial support 
of the National Climate Program Office, can provide 
the data needed for the aforementioned calculations. 
This network currently provides near real-time data 
for seven meteorological parameters-solar radiation, 
wind direction and speed, precipitation, humidity, 
temperature and soil temperature (Hubbard et al., 
1983). 
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Regional automated weather networks in drought-
prone areas and terrestrial sensors in space can provide 
the data base for drought early warning and surveillance 
systems. Atmospheric scientists have a significant con-
tribution to make in the improved collection and in-
terpretation of weather data for drought management. 
Impact assessment procedures. A long-standing 
problem in responding to drought has been the lack of 
reliable procedures for assessing probable impact. Be-
cause drought normally has its most immediate and 
substantial impact on the agricultural sector, improved 
techniques for assessing, in near-real time, the impact 
of weather conditions on crops and rangeland should 
greatly improve our ability to identify and, therefore, 
to speed assistance to areas affected by drought. 
Historically, the most common criterion used by 
government to identify areas stricken by drought has 
been percent of normal precipitation. This information, 
as well as local reports of crop, pasture and livestock 
conditions and human distress, were used extensively 
during the 1930s and 1950s. 
During 1976-77 the PDSI was used by federal agen-
cies and the IDCC to establish eligibility of areas for 
drought relief (GAO, 1979). A map showing the dis-
tribution of PDSI values was (and is) published regu-
larly in the Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin. The 
PDSI is intended to describe long-term moisture con-
ditions. More recently, the Crop Moisture Index (CMI), 
a modification of the PDSI and more agriculturally 
appropriate, has been used by federal agencies to assess 
short-term moisture conditions (Palmer, 1968; Na-
tional Weather Service, 1977). The CMI was not widely 
used during 1976-77. 
The PDSI has been increasingly criticized in recent 
years by scientists (Changnon, 1980; Wilhite, 1983; 
Alley, 1984). Inconsistencies have been noted between 
the PDSI and actual severity of the drought impacts 
observed. There are several reasons for the lack of 
agreement between calculated PDSI values and actual 
drought severity, particularly with respect to agricul-
tural drought. Specific crop responses to drought were 
not considered in the derivation of the index, nor do 
they figure in the calculation of index values. Yet, the 
PDSI is used, qualitatively, to assess drought impacts 
on crops. Additionally, the Thornthwaite method 
(Thornthwaite, 1948) of estimating evapotranspiration 
(ET) is used in the calculation of PDSI values. The 
Thornthwaite method is unable to account for sensible 
heat advection, a major source of the energy that drives 
the ET process in the Great Plains region. Thus, there 
is concern that the Thornthwaite method severely 
underestimates ET in subhumid and semiarid regions 
(Rosenberg, et al., 1983) and, accordingly, that the 
PDSI tends to overestimate the amount of water re-
maining in the soil (Smith, 1983). 
Regional differences in land use and cropping sys-
tems should be considered in the impact assessment 
issue. For example, a PDSI of - 3.0 in July may signal 
substantial reduction in yield of rionirrigated com be-
cause of destruction of reproductive tissue. Were mois-
ture conditions to improve, com yield would still be 
low but soybeans, whose reproductive activity contin-
ues through much ofthe growing season, may produce 
near normal yields. 
Clearly, new techniques must be developed to en-
hance our drought impact assessment capability. Im-
pacts are most precisely estimated on a crop-specific 
basis. Agricultural meteorologists and agronomists, 
working together, have the skills needed to develop 
crop-specific drought indices. Automated weather data 
networks are now providing the data to support the 
development and operation of these indices in some 
drought-prone regions. These data can also support 
numerous other assessment-related activities of state 
government. Therefore, states should play an important 
role in supporting the development and maintenance 
ofthese networks. 
Drought designation procedures. The development 
of objective and timely procedures to determine eli-
gibility for federal disaster assistance is a necessary 
condition for the improvement of government response 
to drought. Although standby legislation and response 
plans may reduce delays in program formulation and 
implementation, the lack of appropriate designation 
procedures and reliable, objective criteria on which to 
base those designations hampers the delivery of pro-
grams to the affected area and leads to ineffective re-
sponse. 
Procedures for designating counties eligible for as-
sistance have changed with each drought episode. Dur-
ing a particular episode, procedures have been altered 
in response to deteriorating weather conditions. 
Changes in political administration in the middle of a 
drought can also be expected to result in changing des-
ignation procedures. During the mid-1970s drought 
the procedure for designating counties eligible for di-
saster assistance was more complicated and confusing 
than it had been in previous droughts, partly because 
more agencies and committees were involved in ad-
ministering the programs (Wilhite et al., 1984), 
The GAO (1978) has summarized the substantial 
differences in the disaster declaration procedures used 
by major agencies-FmHA and SBA during 1977. The 
effect of these differences in disaster declaration pro-
cedures was such that, during the period July 1977 
through January 1978, FmHA and SBA operated their 
programs in 45 and 14 states, respectively. Within states 
where both agencies operated, certain counties were 
covered by only one of the two agency programs. 
Our examination and evaluation of the function, 
procedures and actions ofthe IDCC has identified sev-
eral specific problem areas (Wilhite et al., 1984). First, 
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the existence and precise function of the IDCC was 
poorly understood by government officials, especially 
at the state level. In many cases, designations by the 
committee were interpreted by government officials as 
an automatic qualification of their state or county for 
all federal disaster assistance programs. FmHA's 
Emergency Loan Program was the only government 
program actually enabled by IDCC action. 
Second, IDCC designations were broad and sweep-
ing, and impacts identified by states were not verified 
by the committee on the basis of a common set of 
objective data. No IDCC evaluation criteria were ac-
tually available until early June, and then they were 
not widely understood. Of the 2145 counties designated 
by the IDCC between 25 April and 12 September 1977, 
approximately 1575, or 73 percent, were approved be-
fore the criteria had been properly defined. Although 
entire states were often designated by the IDCC, actual 
impact areas were of limited geographical extent. For 
example, the primary impact area in Nebraska in 1977, 
in terms of production losses of the principal grain 
crops, was confined to a nine-county area in the ex-
treme southeastern comer of the state. The IDCC des-
ignated the entire state (93 counties) on April 25. These 
sweeping designations provided many counties 
throughout the nation not affected by the severe 
drought with access to FmHA emergency loans. This 
action also led to the illusion of a severe nationwide 
drought. Such an illusion can, in the long run, be det-
rimental to the establishment of future drought relief 
programs. The following editorial on the 1977 Federal 
drought response effort (Washington Post, September 
27, 1977) is given as an example: 
THE DISASTER THAT WASN'T 
The com crop this year is the largest in the country's 
history. The wheat and soybean crops are huge and 
come close to setting records of their own. California's 
vegetable production is up. It's been a big year on the 
farm. 
Now consider this curiosity: Two-thirds of the 
country is currently designated a drought disaster area 
by the federal government. There are 3,044 counties 
in the United States, and some 2,100 of them are 
Emergency Drought Impact Areas. They include ev-
erything west of the Mississippi except parts of Texas 
and Washington. They also include much ofthe Mid-
west and a swath of the South from Virginia's Shen-
andoah Valley down to the Gulf Coast. A farmer in a 
drought area is eligible for special loans at interest rates 
as low as 3 percent. 
The weather this year has been, once again, eccentric. 
It was the dry winter that induced President Carter 
and Congress to collaborate on drought-aid legislation 
last spring. Then rain came-not enough to end all of 
the shortages in communities around the country, but 
enough to produce a tremendous harvest. 
Drought aid has now degenerated into a kind of 
general relief for farmers, extended in the form of cheap 
credit. Most of the beneficiaries are currently threat-
ened not by drought and shriveled crops, but by pre-
cisely the opposite condition: crops so magnificently 
bountiful that prices have dropped dramatically. Some 
ofthese farmers, you could argue, genuinely need help. 
But it's a bad practice to bend an aid program covertly 
from one purpose to another. That generally results in 
a lot of aid going to people who don't need it. 
The emergency-<irought program ends on Sept. 30, 
and the question at the Agriculture Department is 
whether to do it again next year. The danger of drought 
is certainly real. It is necessary to think carefully about 
the possibility that the climate-and in particular the 
rain pattern-may be shifting. While this summer's 
rain was enough for the com and wheat, it wasn't 
enough to fill reservoirs and restore water tables. If 
next winter is as dry as last winter, a much larger num-
ber of communities will feel the water shortage. A dry 
summer next year would certainly justify federal aid 
to farmers. 
But the drought aid needs to be tied to the actual 
effect of weather on individual farmer's final harvests. 
The Carter administration has been doing it the other 
way, providing aid on the basis of regional rainfall at 
the beginning of the season. As this year's experience 
shows, that can mean an expensive program of disaster 
aid when, as it turns out, there was no disaster. 
Third, the criteria established by the IDCC were not 
fully reliable for the purpose of identifying affected 
areas, although they were probably the best available 
at the time. Assessments by federal agencies were im-
provised from the data at hand. However, these needed 
data were not available to the committee that was 
charged with evaluating all requests for assistance. Also, 
the data available to the committee was, in some cases, 
out of date. Therefore, decisions were, at times, based 
on information that may not have represented the sit-
uation accurately. 
Disaster programs, program administration and de-
livery systems. As many as forty separate programs were 
available to provide assistance to drought victims in 
the form ofloans, grants and insurance during the mid-
1970s (Table 3). These programs can be clustered into 
two broad categories. The first included short-term ac-
tions to avoid or lessen the impact of drought by aug-
menting water supplies. This was the primary objective 
of President Carter's drought program. The second 
group involved programs designed to make loans to 
farmers to compensate them for production losses and 
to provide them with working capital. The wide range 
of assistance programs available reflects the variety of 
groups and economic sectors affected by drought and 
the lack of a coordinated federal disaster response plan. 
Two characteristics of these disaster programs can 
be noted. First, only a few of the programs available 
in the mid-I 970s were designed to address the specific 
problems associated with drought. Rather, they were 
originally formulated by Congress to respond to prob-
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lems of soil and water conservation and to other natural 
disasters such as flooding. Second, other than the on-
going programs implemented in response to previous 
20th century drought episodes (e.g., Great Plains Con-
servation Program), the programs of the mid-1970s 
were intended to be short-term or tactical. No new 
long-term program initiatives were instituted during 
this period. 
The GAO (1979) indicated four major problem areas 
in its study of the programs and the administration of 
programs that were part of the 1976-77 federal drought 
response effort. First, several drought programs were 
enacted too late to lessen the effects of drought. For 
example, President Carter's drought program did not 
receive congressional approval until April and, in some 
cases, May. In the Far West it had been apparent since 
January 1977 that a water shortage would occur during 
the irrigation season. As another example, delays in 
congressional approval also sharply reduced the effec-
tiveness of certain programs. For example, $75 million 
was authorized to the Bureau of Reclamation for the 
Water Bank Program. However, only $4.8 million was 
spent in this manner because most growers of lower 
value annual crops had already planted by the time 
the program was implemented. It was too late to re-
allocate water to the higher value perennial crops. 
Second, many projects that were approved violated 
. congressional intent to augment water supplies on a 
short-term basis. Several projects were initiated so late 
that water could not be supplied during the drought 
for which the aid had been given. Construction of other 
projects did not even begin until after the drought had 
ended. Also, drought loans and grants appear to have 
been used to provide a low-cost source of federal fi-
nancing for nondrought-related projects. 
Third, eligibility and repayment criteria for emer-
gency drought programs were inconsistent, inequitable 
and confusing. Although substantial differences in cri-
teria existed between many disaster programs, the dif-
ferences between the FmHA's Emergency Loan Pro-
gram and SBA's Disaster Loan Program are, perhaps, 
the most interesting because they were directed to the 
same target groups. (For specific differences between 
these two programs, see the 1978 GAO report.) Loans 
obligated through these two programs totaled $4.63 
billion during 1976-77. 
Fourth, inadequate coordination among agencies led 
to program overlap and nonuniform standards for de-
termining eligible drought relief projects. The GAO 
cites several specific examples of loan applicants ap-
plying to two agencies. In some cases, applications were 
approved by both agencies, and applicants could choose 
the loan with the most favorable terms. 
The GAO (1979) concluded its examination of the 
1976-77 federal drought response effort with the rec-
ommendation that Congress direct the four primary 
agencies administering assistance programs (USDA, 
SBA, Departments of Interior and Commerce) to assess 
the problems encountered in providing emergency re-
lief. Based on the findings of this assessment, GAO 
recommended that a national drought plan be devel-
oped to provide assistance in a more timely, consistent 
and equitable manner. According to GAO, this plan 
should identify the respective roles of agencies to avoid 
the overlap and duplication that has been associated 
with previous drought response efforts. They recom-
mended that the Congress consider legislation that 
would more clearly define those roles, and also rec-
ommended standby legislation (i.e., authorizing assis-
tance programs) to permit more timely response to 
drought-related problems. 
In the light of-our research, the recommendations 
of GAO appear eminently sensible. The number of 
agencies participating in drought assistance activities 
during 1976-77, as well as the number of programs 
available, indicates the obvious need for an assessment 
and response plan organized under the leadership of a 
single agency. In the process of developing such a plan, 
all disaster assistance programs should be reviewed in 
terms of their consistency, efficiency and equity, as well 
as their relevance in dealing with the problems and 
impacts associated with drought. Most assistance pro-
grams were developed, originally, to address problems 
resulting from the occurrence of other natural hazards 
other than drought or in response to specific water sup-
ply problems. During droughts these programs have 
simply been redirected. Also, more attention needs to 
be given to alleviating drought impact and facilitating 
recovery in the agricultural sector. 
We recommend that multidisciplinary studies be 
initiated to define the impacts of past droughts. We 
further recommend that scenarios be used to help eval-
uate probable impacts of future drought. The results 
of such studies could aid in identifying real needs for 
drought assistance programs, reduce the number of 
such programs and lead to improved efficiency in their 
administration. 
5. Conclusions 
Governments in the United States often respond to 
drought through crisis management. This was the case 
in the mid-1970s 'as well as in previous episodes of 
widespread and severe drough( In crisis management 
the time to act is perceived by decision makers to be 
short. Reaction to crisis often results in the implemen-
tation of hastily prepared assessment and response 
procedures that lead to ineffective, poorly coordinated 
and untimely response. If planning were initiated be-
tween periods of drought, the opportunity would exist 
to develop an organized response that might more ef-
fectively address issues and specific problem areas. Also, 
the limited resources available to government to mit-
igate the effects of drought might be allocated in a more 
beneficial manner. 
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In 1979 the General Accounting Office recom-
mended the formulation of a national drought plan to 
provide assistance in a more timely, consistent and eq-
uitable way to drought-affected areas (GAO, 1979). The 
GAO proposed that this plan identify 1) the respective 
roles of agencies involved in drought response to avoid 
overlap and duplication; 2) the need for legislation to 
more closely define these roles; and 3) the need for 
standby legislation to permit more timely response to 
drought-related problems. 
Our report has identified four requirements for ef-
fective response to drought by government. First, re-
liable and timely information on drought conditions 
and drought-related impacts must be developed and 
properly assembled and disseminated. This requires 
near-real time meteorological data on which infor-
mational products can be based. Second, impact as-
sessment techniques must be improved. In the case of 
agriculture, usually the first economic sector to expe-
rience the hardships of drought, new types of analyses 
must be developed to provide decision makers at all 
levels with the types of information necessary to un-
derstand the severity of drought and its impacts so that 
appropriate actions can be implemented in a timely 
manner. Third, designation procedures must be cen-
tralized under a single agency or committee with com-
plete authority to determine eligibility for all assistance 
programs. Criteria must be determined in advance of 
drought, well publicized when drought occurs and ap-
plied in a consistent manner. Finally, assistance pro-
grams must be developed in advance of drought to 
avoid the delays in program formulation and congres-
sional approval that occurred in the mid-1970s. These 
programs should be administered by a single agency 
through the mechanism of an interagency committee 
composed of representatives from all federal agencies 
with responsibility in drought assessment and response. 
State and/or regional representatives should be in-
cluded in the membership of this committee. Assistance 
programs must address the specific problems associated 
with drought. 
The GAO's recommendation for a national drought 
plan has considerable merit. For such a plan to be ef-
fective, however, states must take a more active role 
in planning for drought. In the past, most states have 
played a passive role, relying almost exclusively on the 
federal government to rescue residents of the drought 
area. Although federal government has, for lack of an 
alternative, accepted this role, improving government 
response to drought requires a cooperative effort. States 
must develop their own organizational plans for col-
lecting, analyzing and disseminating information on 
drought conditions. This information should form the 
basis for more objective and timely assessments of im-
pact. Each plan should be unique, reflecting the water 
supply characteristics and problems of the state and 
potential impact areas. State plans should be linked to 
a national drought plan through the interagency com-
mittee(s) with responsibility for drought designation 
and program administration. Because of the limited 
resources available to states, they can be expected to 
provide only a minimal level of financial assistance to 
drought disaster victims. 
One unique aspect of the mid-1970s drought was 
the effectiveness of regional organizations of states in 
focusing the attention of the federal government on 
the problem. The Western Region Drought Action 
Task Force, the Western Governors' Policy Office and 
the Western States Water Council, working in concert, 
were able to make a more unified representation to 
federal officials. This lesson should not be forgotten. 
Regional organizations should consider centralizing 
their monitoring and assessment activities as one means 
of improving the efficiency and accuracy of information 
flow to the federal government and, by so doing, in-
creasing their influence on drought policy. 
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